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STUDY PROJECT

TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE: A RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE YEAR 2000

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE: A RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE YEAR 2000

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The velocity of world change today is astounding. It is probably safe to say that no one could have predicted the dramatic changes which have taken place since the Autumn of 1989. The pace of that change continues, and the various government agencies, to include the Defense Department, are grappling with appropriate United States responses.

The Soviet threat, which has galvanized public support for a strong national defense since the Truman Doctrine was announced 43 years ago, seems to be evaporating. Members of Congress and the news media seem convinced that Soviet intentions are honorable, and that current military force levels are no longer needed to insure the security of the United States. In fact there is a great deal of support for the notion that reductions in the defense budget will result in a "peace dividend" which can be used to reduce the country's deficit or help address domestic problems such as education and the drug war.

It seems clear that these pressures will result in significant budget cuts over the next ten years. For the

Army, these cuts will mean a sizeble reduction of the total force. In fact substantial cuts have already been proposed for both the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Components (RC) in the Fiscal Year (FY) 91 budget.

While it is unclear how deep the cuts will be ultimately, they are sure to be substantial. As the AC is reduced, it is safe to assume that the RC will be forced to shoulder a greater share of the country's defense burden. Given that hypothesis, it is prudent to examine RC organization and structure to ensure the country is getting the most for the defense dollar.

This paper will postulate a potential threat and the resultant U.S. force levels against which suggested Reserve Components organizations can be analyzed. The intent of the paper is to suggest an RC organization which will best serve the security requirements of the nation at the turn of the century and beyond.

CHAPTER 2

THE ENVIRONMENT - BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS

Clearly the dramatic changes which have occurred in the world will force the President to reassess the national security strategy. This new strategy will establish the parameters whithin which the new national military strategy will be constructed. While the final form of this strategy is uncertain, several features can be predicted with reasonable accuracy. From these basic features some key assumptions can be drawn with respect to land force requirements to support the hypothetical strategy.

REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS

Three areas of the world will emerge as key to U.S. interests: Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Southwest Asia (SWA). Europe will continue to ride high on the national priority list because "we share a common heritage and democratic values with Western European countries . . . and benefit from interdependent economic relations."[1] The Pacific Rim will increase in importance as the preponderance of trade shifts to that region. Similarly, Southwest Asia will become more important by the turn of the century when most of the industrialized nations, to include the Soviet Union, become dependent upon oil from the region.

The military strategy and forces necessary to support U.S. intrests in these areas are not as straight forward. Some assumptions must be made to facilitate subsequent analysis. Each region will be discussed in turn. Those assumptions common to all areas will be addressed following the regional assessments.

EUROPE

Although the threat seems to be diminishing presently in Europe, that may not remain so over the course of the decade. Assessment of threat is a function of capabilities, intent, and circumstances.[2] In terms of capability, the Soviet Union will remain the only nation which can seriously challange this country militarily, even after the conventional disarmament dust has settled. Present circumstances in Eastern Europe make a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack against NATO a remote possibility at best. However, that may not remain true over time. The potential reunification of Germany makes the Poles extremely apprehensive. In fact, it is quite possible that, unlike other Eastern European countries, Poland will allow the USSR to maintain Soviet troops on her soil as a hedge against potential German aggression. Further, the Soviets may not pull troops out of East Germany and sign a peace treaty. The result of such actions would leave Soviet troops in

position to strike against the West if the proper set of circumstances were presented.

The ultimate shape of Eastern Europe is still not certain. The history of most of those countries is not one of democracy. In fact it is just the opposite - one of autocratic rule. It is quite possibe that these initial attempts at democratic pluralism will be unsuccessful, and strong autocratic figures may emerge to "lead" those countries out of the resultant chaos. Should this happen, a "common European home" would be unlikely. In fact Eastern Europe might more closely resemble pre-World War I Europe which could create circumstances that promote war.

Thus, the following key assumptions with respect to the European theater may by made:

* NATO will remain a viable political and military organization and the U.S. will remain a member.

* The six POMCUS sets presently in Europe will remain after CFE.

* Any future war in Europe will be short (six to eight weeks) and violent.

* The U.S. forward deployed land forces will consist of one corps with two divisions.[3]

* The U.S. commitment to NATO will be 6 divisions in 10 days, 4 additioal divisions in 20 days, and a total of 12 divisions in 30 days.[4]

THE PACIFIC RIM

From a military standpoint, the situation in the Pacific should remain relatively stable. Korea will remain the most likely area for a conflict, but the South Koreans will be capable of dealing with the North Korean threat with only minor assistance from the U.S. China, although a formidable foe in a land campaign, will continue to have difficulty projecting that force beyond her borders. Japan will assume more of the defense burden for the Pacific Rim and her military will grow accordingly. Key assumptions with respect to the Pacific region are:

* There will be minimal forward deployed forces in Korea.

* The U.S. will maintain strong bilateral relatiors with Japan, to include military agreements.

* The Soviet navy will not expand significantly over the decade.

* U.S. land force commitments to the area will be three divisions in the initial stages of any conflict.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

As discussed previously, South West Asia, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, will become more important over the course of the decade. By the turn of the century most of the industrial nations (including the Soviet Union) will be dependent upon the region for the majority of their oil needs. The region is rife with conflict, and to make matters worse the armies of the various countries are amoung the most modern in the world. That trend will continue. U.S. forces targeted against that region must be capable of defeating a sophisticated, armored threat. Key assumptions with respect to this region are as follows:

* The most robust contingency in the region would require six army divisions.

* Forces deployed in Europe could be used under certain circumstances.

* Warning time will permit timely deployment of armored forces to the region.

GLOBAL ASSUMPTIONS

In addition to the assumptions associated with the key regions, several "global" assumptions are necessary before RC structure can be addressed. These assumptions are listed below.

* Major U.S. military involvement will be limited to one key region at a time. Simultaneous involvement could be possible on a limited basis elsewhere.

* Congressional pressures on the budget will result in a 500K man Army by the year 2000.

* RC force structure will be sized based upon the total force requirements established in the regional discussions above.

* The Army will continue to equip AC and RC units on a "first to fight" basis.

* The Army will continue to use AirLand Battle Doctrine.

Having established one possible basis for future Army force requirements, it should now be possible to address the Active and Reserve Components mix of our future force. However, additional issues involved in this decision warrant discussion before the Total Army construct is described. These are discussed in the following section.

ENDNOTES

1. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988, p. 27.

2. Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security, pp. 205-223. Chapter 12 contains a thorough description of capabilities, intent and circumstances with respect to the Soviet Union.

3. Bernard J. Adelsberger, "1991 Budget Chops 17,000 Troops," Army Times, 5 February 1990, p. 6. For the sake of this discussion the forces listed provide a reasonable start point for analysis.

4. The European force requirements are based upon my assessment that the extremely long post CFE warning times presently being advertised (in some circles up to six months) are irrelevant. The key variable is not warning time, but mobilization time which requires a political decision. Although there is little doubt that the alliance would pick up the several key indicators, there is a great deal of doubt that the political decision to deploy forces would be made in a timely fashion. A more likely scenario is one in which the decision is made at a point which requires a race between adversaries to see which could achieve the necessary military capability first.

CHAPTER 3

RELEVANT ISSUES

Several issues will impact any decision concerning the shape of the Army by the end of the decade. Those issues are addressed below beginning with the vision for the Army of the future.

Any future force should possess certain characteristics which reflect the present and projected global and domestic environments. The force characteristics which describe a force postured for future flexibility are:[1]

* The force must be trained and ready while continuing to modernize.

* The force will be primarily CONUS based, deployable, and sustainable.

* The force must be expansible to meet the needs of the people.

* It must be grounded in sound principles and doctrine.

* It must be led by quality officers and sergeants.

These characteristics suggest the general shape of the future force. The essence of this force is described in the following bullets.[2]

* The force will be smaller but retain high quality.

* Following arms control cuts, selected residual forces will be postured for Europe and the Pacific.

* The Army must possess capable contingency forces.

* The Army must have rapid reinforcement forces, but with a global reach.

* Sustained reinforcement forces will be imbedded in the Reserve Components.

Clearly the future force must be a mix of Active and Reserve Components. At issue is the proportions of this mix. The projected force requirements, fiscal realities, and history do not permit an AC only solution. In fact RC forces will have to be used early in any conflict if the nation is to be successful. The question is, how should the early deploying AC divisions be augmented by the Reserve Components? Should the round-out concept be expanded, or should an alternative solution be examined?

Within the Reserve Components there are several important issues which must be considered. The first of

these is coordination and control of the RC at the highest levels. Is the status quo adequate, or would it be better to orchestrate the activities of the National Guard and USAR through one "super" agency? Perhaps the time is right to revisit the issue of combining the National Guard and USAR into a single entity.3

Assuming that both components remain, the issue of force balance must be addressed. Presently 70% of the Total Army combat service support (CSS) capability is imbedded within the RC. Of that figure 64% is in the USAR.4 Perhaps CSS should be redistributed across the force.

Another issue is RC readiness. Clearly RC units cannot be expected to be as proficient as their AC counterparts. There simply is insufficient time to accomplish the necessary training. The challenge then is to ensure that the early deploying RC units achieve the highest possibe state of readiness.

Finally, there are several political issues which must be addressed. The first of these is the political appeal of transferring ever increasing responsibility for national security to the Reserve Components. Reserve forces cost significantly less to maintain, so in the absence of training and readiness considerations, RC forces appear to be a solid bargain.

Any decision to tamper with the Reserve Components status quo must be made with a full appreciation for the powerful lobbies that exist for both. The RC must be convinced that any change is not a threat to their survival and that it is in the best interests of the nation.

Finally, there is the issue of reserve mobilization. Any force mix proposal must consider the probability the Department of Defense (DOD) and untimately the President will be reluctant to mobilize the reserves until it is absolutly clear that U.S. vital interests are threatened.[5] Operation Just Cause in Panama is the most recent example of this reluctance. On the other hand, selective reserve mobilization can be used effectively to convey national resolve to a potential adversary. The last time this tool was used was President Kennedy's reserve activation during the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961.[6]

With the key issues identified, it is now possible to describe a possible future force.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of the Army, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Briefing: "World-Wide Political-Military Environment", chart 19.

2. Ibid, chart 21.

3. This is not a new idea. A brief discussion of the history and politics involved can be found in Martin Binkin, US RESERVE FORCES The Problem of the Weekend Warrior, pp. 36-37.

4. U.S. Army War College, SPECIAL TEXT - Force Integration Case Study, p. C-1.

5. Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, U. S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pp. 108-109

6. Ibid, p. 47.

CHAPTER 4

THE TOTAL FORCE CONSTRUCT

Army forces required to protect U.S. interests in the three key regions described previously will define the size of the future force. Because of the assumption that only one major conflict will be fought at a given time, rapid reinforcement forces can be targeted against several contingencies. Thus, the total force can be kept at an absolute minimum. Summing the division requirements for each region, while at the same time maintaining a four division contingency corps to respond elsewhere in the world, a total Army force of 19 divisons is required. Given this requirement, it is now time to address the Active and Reserve Components mix.

THE ACTIVE COMPONENT

The Active force must consist of no fewer than twelve divisions. That force provides two divisions forward depolyed in Europe, one in the Pacific (Hawaii), a four division contingency corps stationed in CONUS, and five divisions (with two corps headquarters) for rapid reinforcement. All five rapid reinforcement divisions must train for a European contingency and for either a SWA or

Pacific contingency. With this force the President can respond immediately with adequate forces wherever U.S. intrests are threatened.

Of the twelve divisions identified, four will be wholly active while the remainder will require RC augmentation through Roundout, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, or a combination of the two. Only 25% of the non-divsional combat and combat support (CS) forces will be in the active force (about the same percentage that exists today), while 75% of the combat service support (CSS) forces required for the twelve divisions will be active (an increase over that which exists today).

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Reserve Components will provide the 7 remaining divisions, non-division combat and CS forces, and CSS forces required for the 19 division total force. These forces will have specific readiness requirements based upon projected deployment times into a theater. The rapid deploying, or Category 1 units, must be mobilized, trained, and deployed so as to arrive in Europe in 20 days. Clearly training time after mobilization will be short which suggests a force that is basically trained and ready when the "balloon goes up." Three divisions would fall into this catagory. Two of them

can fall in on POMCUS equipment while the other must be deployed with its equipment.

The next level of readiness is Category 2. Units in this catagory must be capable of mobilizing, training, and deploying in 30 days. Assuming a week for mobilization and a week for deployment, these units will have approximately two weeks of post mobilization training time available. Given the projected world situation discussed previously, two divisions must meet these requirements.

The lowest level of readiness is Category 3. Units in this catagory have more that 45 days to mobilize, train, and deploy. These units will have approximately one month of post mobilization training time avialable. For the projected force, two divisions are required in this late deploying catagory.

The forces discussed above do not include the RC augmentation to the Active Component. As suggested previously, Roundout units will play a crucial role. The concept has been proven. The challange is to ensure that performance of these units approaches that of their active counterparts given one-fifth the training time.[1]

Roundout units are not the only answer to the augmentation problem. An alternative to unit augmentation is individual augmentation. Under this concept, the

existing Individual Mobilization Augmentee program will be dramatically expanded to provide reserve soldiers to fill selected Active Component combat, combat support, and combat service support spaces. Details of this concept will be addressed in the next section.

ENDNOTES

1. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, p. 67.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

Any analysis of Reserve Components force structure must begin with Total Army requirements and the Active Component portion of that force. As previously established, the total requirement for 19 divisions, must contain 12 active. However, the RC contribution to the total force will not be limited to the remaining seven divisions.

ACTIVE FORCES

Twelve active divisions represent the minimum force necessary to respond rapidly to threats to U.S. national interests. That force is significantly less than the 16 divison force recently proposed by the Army,[1] but substantially more than the eight division force proposed in a recent article in FORTUNE magazine.[2] Although the force proposed in this article is radically different from that proposed by the Army, it does reflect growing public pressures to reduce defense expenditures. It is clear these pressures will result in substantially reduced defense budgets - perhaps by as much as one third in real terms over the course of the decade. For the Army, losses in Total

Obligation Authority (TOA) translate to space cuts - most probably to a strength of about 500k.

Not all of that 500k will be "foxhole strength" or part of the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) Army. The Army requires a substantial overhead to support it's TOE units.[3] The Army Material Command (AMC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Transients, Trainees, Holding, and Students (TTHS) account are but a few examples. As the Army reduces in size, these overhead spaces will also be cut, but not at the same rate as spaces in the TOE Army. This is because the functions provided by the various agencies are required regardless of the size of the total Army (training still needs to be provided, equipment developed, and soldiers transferred).

Assuming that non-TOE spaces are cut by only 20% as the total Army shrinks by one third, the end state would have some 200k soldiers in these accounts. That would only leave 300k spaces for the TOE Army. If the Division Force Equivalent (DFE) of 38k is used as a rule of thumb, the Active Component could field less than eight full strength, fully supported divisions without Reserve Component augmentation.

At this point it will be useful to explain briefly the concept of DFE as it will be used in the subsequent

analysis. The Army DFE is a force accounting tool which describes a division and all the nondivisional units required to support it within a theater of operation. The DFE is divided into three increments: a division increment (DI), a nondivisional combat increment (NDCI), and a tactical support increment (TSI). The DI consists of the combat, CS, and CSS units of the division. The NDCI consists of separate maneuver brigades, Armored Cavalry Regiments, nondivisional field and air defense artillery units, attack and assault aviation units and nondivisional combat engineer units. The TSI consists of the remaining nondivisional CS and CSS units necessary to sustain the division and NDCI in the theater.[4]

The DFE presently used by the Army staff represents 48k spaces. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center has developed an Army of Excellence (AOE) DFE of 38k. The AOE DFE consists of a 15.2k DI, a 9.3k NDCI, and a 13.5k TSI.[5] This analysis uses the AOE DFE because it represents a realistic force sizing figure given recent force effectiveness enhancements and fiscal constraints. If the 48k DFE were used, the RC augmentation problem described below would be significantly greater.

The challenge then is how to field the twelve active divisions required. Given that 300k spaces are available and 12 divisions are necessary, each DFE can only consist of

25k. The issue now becomes one of how to structure the division and its nondivisional support.

Clearly one option is to completely fill the DI at the expense of the NDCI and TSI. However, the short duration hypothesized for future conflicts and the current Combat Service Support (CSS) imbalance between AC and RC suggest the need for increased CSS in the AC. If that premise is accepted, the TSI should be filled at a reasonably high level - a minimum of 75% of that required or 10.13k spaces per division (.75 x 13.5).

Given the decision concerning TSI spaces, DI and NDCI spaces must be addressed. The Army traditionally has relied upon the RC to provide the lion's share of the NDCI and there seems little reason for change. Accordingly, the AC should provide only 25% of the NDCI requirement for the 12 division force or 2.33k spaces per division (.25 x 9.3). The TSI and NDCI assumptions result in 12.54k DI spaces per division or about 80% of the reqirement [25 -(10.13+2.33)].

With the gross force accounting decisions made, the DI spaces must be allocated across the AC divisions. This allocation decision will impact upon the RC options for augmenting the AC divisions.

For the sake of this analysis, assume the 15.2k DI represents the spaces required to completely fill the

combat, CS, and CSS units of a notional division. Given this assumption, one option would be to fill all divisions equally at 80% of the required DI. This option ignores the operational realities of the forward deployed units and is therefore not the wisest choice. Alternatively, some divisions could be filled completely at the expense of the remaining units.

For this argument, four divisions will be filled at 100% of the requirement, while the remaining eight divisions will be filled at only 70-75% of the requirement. The four divisions will include the two forward deployed divisions in Europe, the division in the Pacific, and the airborne division (to account for the unique skills demanded by this division).

With the Active force adequately defined, the Reserve Components contribution to the total force can now be described and analyzed.

RESERVE COMPONENTS FORCES

SIZE OF THE RC

An appropriate place to begin the RC analysis is with the total RC force reqirement. As previously postulated, 19

divisions will be required to protect national interests. Using the Army of Excellence DFE of 38k, 722k "fighting" spaces are required in the total force. Based upon the AC TOE strength of 300k established in the preceding section, the Reserve Components will have to fill 422k "fighting" spaces.

As was the case with the Active Component, the RC requires overhead to support the TOE units. For this analysis, assume a 15% reduction from FY89 overhead figures. This results in about 90k spaces. Thus, the total required RC selected reserve strength totals 512k.

This figure, while substantially less than the FY88 selected reserve end strength of 768.7k[6], is consistent with the global assumptions addressed at the begining of this paper. Furthermore, the reduction of spaces does not suggest a corresponding reduction in RC funding - an issue which will be addressed later.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

To this point in the analysis no attempt has been made to discriminate between Reserve Components. The reason for this omission is the lack of a clear national strategy and consensus for the use of the RC. Clearly reserve forces

command and control would be much easier if only one component was involved. Unfortunately, the Army must deal with two, and that fact is not likely to change. Any effort to merge the components is apt to meet the same fate as previous attempts, because ". . the reserves have long benefited from pressure exerted on their behalf by legislators influenced by broad grassroots support and a strong, well-organized lobby."[7]

Given that both components will long be a part of the Total Force, the challenge is to achieve the highest return for the taxpayer's dollar. The only way to accomplish this is to have a single "agency" which coordinates the efforts of both components. The basis for such an agency exists now in the Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC). This group contains all the key players and could provide the central direction necessary.

The RCCC cannot operate without a "game plan". The first step must be taken by the President and his advisors by reformulating the National Security Stratey based upon current and projected world events. To have any value in future decisons, that strategy must be accepted by key congressional leaders. Given an accepted strategy, the resultant national military strategy and force requirements developed by the JCS and Department of Defense can be justified.

With a strategy and force requirements, the RCCC will be able to address the difficult RC issues with a reasonable expectation that Congress will accept the decisions in the best interests of the nation. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units which are no longer required can be inactivated while federal funding can be withheld from National Guard (NG) units which are no longer necessary. Additionally, large units may be organized from elements of both components. These initiatives will eliminate needless competition between the components and ensure the highest return for the defense dollar.

AUGMENTATION OF THE ACTIVE COMPONENT

Previous discussion has established the fact that insufficient spaces exist to fill fully 12 AOE DFE's. In fact, shortfalls exist in all three increments. The TSI shortfall occurs in nondivisional support and can be filled adequately by later deploying RC units. The shortage of non-divisional combat forces can also be accepted for some period of time, so it seems reasonable for many of those forces to be in the RC. The Division Increment, on the other hand, represents those forces which must be immediately available. Thus, the remainder of the augmentation discussion will center on these forces.

The shortfall of DI spaces in the active divisions is approximately 32k based upon the assumptions made in the preceding analysis. The challenge is to augment 8 active divisions while providing the best combat potential. Two options appear to provide the most potential - the round-out concept and an expanded Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) concept.

THE ROUND-OUT CONCEPT

The Army has a great deal of experience with the round-out concept. It has been used with some success for years. On the surface round-out would clearly seem to be the option of choice. However, the readiness demands of the smaller, 19 division force will place unprecedented demands on round-out units. To be an effective and integral part of the division, the round-out unit must be trained to a level equal to that of its active counterparts. This is a mammoth task considering the RC unit has only 39 training days a year - less than one fifth the time available to active units.8

Obviously one way to address the time problem is to increase the training time available to RC round-outs. Unfortunately, such increases can have unwanted side effects which drive soldiers away from enlisting. Furthermore, US

RC units already have more training time than reserves of any allied country to include Israel whose national survival depends on them.[9] A better approach would be to get more out of the available training time.

To get the most out of training, units must have adequate full-time leadership. This is not merely a desirable situation, but a mandatory requirement. The Army must be prepared to fund full-time positions, and potential incumbents to those designated positions must agree to full-time status. If RC leaders cannot be found to fill these slots then they should be filled from the active component.

The issue of round-out unit size must also be addressed. Experience has shown that "Because of limitations in personnel, materiel, facilities, and especially time, the readiness objectives of reserve units typically have been less ambitious than those of their active counterparts. Combat readiness at the company level has been the normal - if rarely attained - goal of reserve units, on the assumption that sufficient time between mobilization and deployment would be available to train them up to higher standards, if necessary."[10]

This is reality and suggests that round-out be executed at the company/battery/troop level. However, round-out

brigades have proven to be successful under our current scheme. The issue of round-out unit size can be addressed on a case by case basis as the force is drawn down. However, a key ingredient in any round-out concept is the requirement for the full-time service of leaders.

THE EXPANDED IMA CONCEPT

The second augmentation option is the expanded IMA concept. Under this proposal individuals not affiliated with reserve units would be used to fill active divisions. This has an advantage in that it is generally easier to achieve individual proficiency than it is to achieve and maintain collective proficiency in the same available training time.

Under this proposal selected active units would be manned at a lower Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), perhaps ALO 3 (approximately 70% of TOE requirements). The active personnel shortages would be located within crews that are capable of training and maintaining at prescribed levels eventhough short the personnel which would be required to conduct sustained wartime operations. These shortages would be filled by USAR IMA's upon deployment.

IMA's, like RC unit members, would be required to attend Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) with designated AC units. The AC units would be obligated to conduct weekend training once each month to accomodate their RC members. This should not cause a problem. In fact, this scheduling should also accomodate the needs of the affiliated round-out unit or units. The two week AT should be similarly scheduled.

In the initial stages of this program, qualified reservists will have to be recruited from across the country. This could increase the cost of the program in the beginning due largely to travel costs. As the program matures it should be possibe to recruit the requisite personnel from within the geographical region of the AC division, subsequently reducing costs.

Another potential advantage to this concept is, in the event of a crisis such as the recent Panama operation, the DOD could solicit volunteers to fill the slots. A positive response to such a solicitation would keep the President from having to exercise his reserve call-up authority if the political climate so dictates.

In conclusion it seems the solution to the Active Component augmentation problem is a combination of the tried and true round-out concept and an expansion of the IMA

program. Implementation of both these programs should insure the combat readiness of our active divisions.

MAJOR RC FORCES

Having addressed reserve augmentation to the active divisions, it is now time to discuss the remainder of the RC forces. As outlined previously, the RC must provide seven DFEs plus the AC DFE shortfall discussed previously. The discussion in this section will be limited to the divisions, although the principles apply equally to the other forces.

Based upon the projected threat and the constrained size of the active force, RC divisions will be expected to deploy and fight much earlier than ever before. In fact using the short-war, European scenario for this analysis, three divisions will be required in Europe in 20 days. The question is can the RC units achieve this kind of readiness? The answer, supported by several sources, appears to be no.11

If the budget will not support additional AC forces, then RC readiness will have to be increased for specific units. The first step in this process is to admit that units may have different readiness requirements, and that

each should be manned and trained to accomodate those requirements.

Using the European scenario as a guide, those units required in country by M+20 should be designated as Category 1 divisions. These divisions may have, at best, a few days to train in theater prior to commitment. Accordingly, these units must be as well trained as the round-outs discussed previously, with the same imperatives applying. Because training time cannot be increased significantly without side effects, the unit leadership positions must also be filled by full time personnel. This full time support can be either Active Guard Reserve (AGR) or AC soldiers. In recent years there appears to be congressional support for the latter because AC soldiers actually cost less than full time RC support.12

Given this congressional support, the Army should ensure a strong AC representation in Category 1 divisions. One or two percent of a division's strength would not be excessive (500-1000 total spaces in the three divisions of interest). These AC soldiers should be assigned at all echelons from company to division, and should serve with those units just as if they were active units. Further, the Army should ensure that service with these reserve divisions is career enhancing (the recent example of the Army Acquisition Corps could be used as a model). The spaces to

support this initiative should be supported because they represent less than two-tenths of a percent of the AC total and are cheaper than full time RC support.

While Category 2 divisions will have more post-mobilization training time available, perhaps as much as two weeks, it will only be sufficient to polish the rough edges. Accordingly, leadership positions and key staff positions must also be filled by full-time personnel. AC participation in these units can be limited to those key positions which cannot be filled by full-time RC personnel.

Finally, Category 3 units are those with arrival dates of M-45 and beyond. These units will have adequate post mobilization time, and can continue to operate under the current operational model without increasing full time positions or relying on AC soldiers to fill leadership positions.

THE COSTS

Clearly the budget continues to be the major driver in the defense equation. Many of the units and functions in the RC today are there because they represented the "cheap" solution. Most of the initiatives described above will cost

more not less, so how can they be justified? The answer can be found in the Total Army realignment.

Under the proposed force structure, RC forces were reduced by some 270k selected reserve spaces. This reduction saves about $1.9 Billion FY 89 dollars. Assuming and average salary for full-time support personnel of $50,000 and assuming RC funding remains constant, there are adequate funds to pay for the 1700-2000 spaces required in the five divisions effected.[13]

ENDNOTES

1. Bernard J. Adelsberger, "1991 Budget Chops 17000 Troops," Army Times, 5 Feb 90, p. 6.

2. Lee Smith, "How Big a Military Does the U.S. Need?" FORTUNE, 31 July 1989, p. 141.

3. U.S. Army War College, SPECIAL TEXT - Force Integration Case Study. An examination of Appendix E reveals that non-TOE portion of the Army has ranged from 36-38% of the active force.

4. U.S. Army War College, ARMY COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, p. 10-22.

5. U.S. Army War College, SPECIAL TEXT - Force Integration Case Study, p. B-1.

6. Reserve Forces Policy Board, RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS Fiscal Year 1988, p. 38.

7. Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pp. 32-33.

8. U.S. Army Training Board, TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS, PP. 1-2.

9. Ibid, p. 3.

10. Binkin and Kaufmann, p. 79.

11. Ibid., pp. 92-93; Liz Galtney, "The Sad State of Weekend Warriors", U.S. News and World Report, 25 Sep 89, pp. 28-30; and RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS Fiscal Year 1987, p. 162 (in that the data reflects only those units C-3 or better and does not show the number of units at C-1 and C-2)

12. Binkin and Kaufmann, p. 72.

13. Dollar figures were derived from the NG and USAR personnel appropriations listed in RESERVE PROGRAMS FY88, P. 11. Total selected reserve strength from p. 38 was divided into total personnel dollars to obtain an average cost per selected reservist. The general dimension of the full-time support salary comes from Binkin and Kaufmann p. 71. Key position figures are based upon the rationale: two per

company plus five on the battalion staff for a total of 15 per battalion. 21 battalions in a typical division times 15 spaces per battalion plus an allowance for the division staff results in about 350 spaces per divsion.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There can be little doubt the world is changing at a tremendously rapid pace, and those changes will cause a fundamental change in thinking with respect to national defense. Key to the continued success of our country will be our ability to keep pace with the change and not be overcome by it.

The focus of this paper was to stimulate debate concerning the role and organization of the Reserve Components at the turn of the century. The preceding discussion suggests several conclusions:

1. The President and the National Security Council (NSC) must reassess the national security strategy. The review completed in 1989 can no longer be valid given the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe, and the fiscal realities which have resulted from those changes. This assessment is crucial to an informed approach to ascertaining DOD requirements.

2. The resultant strategy must not be solely the creation of the Executive Branch. This statement smacks of heresy, but it reflects political reality. The strategy is key to all that follows. Without

congressional support and approval, it will be impossible to overcome the inertia which can be expected in those organizations targeted for change. Members of the Congress will have to be part of the process to ensure their support.

3. Given the new strategy, the JCS will have to ascertain the national military strategy and forces necessary to accomplish the national objectives. The procedures are in place to accomplish this so long as reasonable fiscal guidance accompanies the strategic guidance.

With Army force requirements provided by JCS and Active force levels authorized through the POM years and beyond, the Army staff can begin to work the Reserve Components requirements and authorizations. It is clear that the RC will shoulder a sizable portion of the defense burden. The goal of the Army is to provide the RC with the resources to accomplish their assigned missions at the lowest cost to the taxpayer. With that goal in mind, the following recommendations are offered:

1. The Reserve Component Coordination Council should be the Army agency charged with the responsibility and authority to coordinate the efforts of the USAR and NG.

This group consists of the players necessary to provide the central direction.

2. Key leadership positions in round-out units must be filled by full-time personnel to insure that those units are nearly as well trained as their active counterparts.

3. RC units should be manned, equipped, and trained in accordance with their expected deployment requirements. Accordingly, three categories are proposed. Category 1 units are the first to deploy and must maintain the highest readiness. Therefore, to facilitate the achievement of training standards within the allotted training time, those units should be staffed with a combination of full-time reservists and AC soldiers in key leadership positions. Category 2 units are the next to deploy. Their training standards, while not as demanding as the Category 1 units, will require the assignment of full-time reservists to key slots. Category 3 units are the last to deploy and can continue to operate without additional full time support.

4. Finally, selected AC units should be "fleshed out" with USAR Individual Mobilization Augmentees. This concept will provide rapidly expansible forces while

increasing training readiness and morale without an attendant decrease in unit performance.

These recommendations can ensure a Total Army which is capable of accomplishing the national security and military strategies at the lowest budget authorization acceptable to maintain our nation's goals and interests.

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18. The White House. NATIONAL SECURTIY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES. Washington: The White House, 1988.